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NOTE

THERE IS NO JOY IN D.C., THE MIGHTY COURT STRUCK OUT:
AN ANALYSIS OF CLINTON V. CITY OF NEW YORK,
THE LINE ITEM VETO ACT AND THE COURT’S FAILURE
TO UPHOLD CONSTITUTIONALLY LEGITIMATE MEANS
TO A VIABLE END

I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars and leading political figures touted the advantages of the line item
veto for decades before Congress enacted the Line Item Veto Act of 1996
(“Act”).1 While rampant federal spending, a mounting national debt, and a
Republican coup de ete in 1994 ensured the Act’s passage,2 its constitutionality
was attacked from the outset. Shortly after being signed into law, the Act
suffered a challenge from the National Treasury Employees Union claiming
that the Act compromised its ability to influence favorable legislation that

1. Anthony R. Petrilla, Note: The Role of the Line-Item Veto in the Federal Balance of
Power, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469, 474 (1993) (discussing the political impetus leading to the
consideration of a federal line item veto statute). See also Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-130, § 3, 110 Stat. 1211 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692 (Supp. III 1997).
2. Neal E. Devins, In Search of the Lost Chord: Reflections on the 1996 Item Veto Act, 47
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1605, 1607 (1997). See also Petrilla, supra note 1, at 469; Steven
Erlanger, Inflation and Unpaid Haunt Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1994, at A9 (quoting Sen.
Everett M. Dirksen). Also note that in 1994, the year when the real momentum had begun
regarding a line item veto-like reform and two years before the passage of the Line Item Veto
Act, the deficit was projected to hit $322 billion, and the national debt was to reach $4.2 trillion.
Id. See also OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV’T:
FISCAL YEAR 1994 (1993); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.A. STATISTICS IN BRIEF 1992: A
SUPPLEMENT (1993); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-491, at 15 (1996) (describing the growing
national debt as “astonishing”).
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would benefit its constituency.3 The Union brought its complaint to the D.C.
circuit, challenging the constitutionality of the Act; the case was dismissed
because the issue was not yet ripe.4 Certain members of Congress also
challenged the Act and brought suit on the ground that it deprived them of their
rights as legislators.5 The Supreme Court turned them away as well, holding
that they did not have standing to bring suit.6 In Clinton v. City of New York,7
however, the Court finally addressed the constitutional objections to the Act on
their merits and struck it down as an unconstitutional violation of the
Presentment Clause.8
This Note examines the Court’s reasoning in Clinton v. City of New York.
Following this brief introduction, Section II of this note examines the history
leading up to the Court’s decision in Clinton. First, the political events leading
to passage of Act are investigated; 9 second, a legislative analysis is offered,
focusing on the exact nature of the powers granted to the President under the
Act;10 third, a case history of Clinton is established;11 and fourth, a brief
examination of the history and meaning of the Presentment Clause is given.12
Section III is a discussion of the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions
in Clinton.13 Section IV of this Note provides the author’s analysis of the
Act’s procedures and consequences as related to the Presentment Clause and
Separation of Powers principles, and further discusses the fate of the line item
veto following Clinton.14
In conclusion, it is argued that the Clinton Court misread the Act.
Contrary to the belief of the majority, the statute did not confer new and
sweeping powers or threaten individual liberty.15 The Court was distracted by
the political hype and imaginary evils of the line item veto. Had the Act
authorized the President to “decline to spend” rather than “veto,” as previous
statutes had authorized him to do, the Court likely would have followed its

3. National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1425 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (the federal employees’ union brought suit claiming the Line Item Veto Act was
unconstitutional).
4. Id.
5. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 815-16 (1997) (holding that members of Congress who
brought the suit did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act).
6. Id. at 830.
7. Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998).
8. Id. at 2104.
9. See infra notes 19-40 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 66-158 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 159-256 and accompanying text.
15. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2108-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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own precedent and upheld the Act.16 The Clinton Court was so concerned with
the apparent textual ramifications of the Act and its title that it failed to give
proper context to a congressional attempt to police itself from decades of
deficit spending17 and restore the balance of power the Founding Fathers
envisioned.18
II. BACKGROUND
A. Political History
In the years leading up to the passage of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996,19
annual budget deficits and rampant federal spending had created a feeling that
16. Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17. Devins, supra note 2, at 1605.
18. Id. at 1610. Those who claim the line item veto inappropriately shifted power toward the
President should remember that the 1974 Budget Impoundment Act, which is often cited as a
cause of recent deficit spending, was a tremendous shift of power away from the Executive.
Line-Item Veto: Courting a Better Way: Congress Ought to Restore This Pork-busting Power,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 2, 1998, at A20 [hereinafter Line Item Veto: Courting a Better
Way].
19. The Line Item Veto Act §691 provides:
(a) In general
Notwithstanding the provisions of subchapter I and II of [The Impoundment Control and
Line Item Veto Chapter], and subject to the provisions of this subchapter, the President
may, with respect to any bill or joint resolution that has been signed into law pursuant to
Article I, section 7, of the Constitution of the United States, cancel in whole—
(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority;
(2) any item of new direct spending; or
(3) any limited tax benefit;
if the President –
(A) determines that such cancellation will –
(i) reduce the federal budget deficit;
(ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and
(iii) not harm the national interest; and
(B) notifies the Congress of such cancellation by transmitting a special message, in
accordance with section 691a of [Title 2], within five calendar days (excluding Sundays)
after the enactment of the law providing the dollar amount of discretionary budget
authority, item of new direct spending, or limited tax benefit that was cancelled.
Identification of cancellations
(b) In identifying dollar amounts of discretionary budget authority, items of new direct
spending, and limited tax benefits for cancellation, the President shall –
(1) consider the legislative history, construction, and the purposes of the law which
contains such dollar amounts, items, or benefits;
(2) consider any specific sources of information referenced in such law or, in the
absence of specific sources of information, the best available information; and
(3) use the definitions contained in section 691e of [Title 2] in applying this subchapter
to the specific provisions of such law.
(c) Exception for disapproval bills.
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the budget and the everyday appropriations process was spinning out of
control.20 This political and economic reality prompted many economists,
government leaders and, most frequently, political candidates to call for
affirmative steps to reduce budget shortfalls and deficit spending.21 Many saw
the presidential line item veto as a necessary weapon to restore some measure
of fiscal discipline inside the Beltway.22
Years before the line item veto was enacted on the federal level, many
candidates for political office had campaigned in support of a line item veto.23
During the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan actively campaigned for a
presidential line item veto to cut “wasteful spending.”24 President Reagan
lobbied for an executive power similar to that exercised by forty-three of our
nation’s fifty governors. Like the federal line item veto power the President
would eventually receive, line item veto authority of state governors also came
under constitutional attack.25
In Iowa, Governor Ray used his line item veto power to excise particular
sections from five separate appropriation bills.26 State senator Rush filed suit
claiming that the items vetoed were not items at all, rather, they were nonseverable provisos or limitations and not subject to veto.27 In Rush v. Ray, the
Iowa Supreme Court held that the line item veto is a negative power that does
not permit an executive to legislate by distorting legislative intent.28 Hence,
The authority granted by subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any dollar
amount of discretionary budget authority, item of new direct spending, or limited tax
benefit contained in any law that is a disapproval bill as defined in section 691e of this
title.
2 U.S.C. § 691 (Supp. III 1997).
Section 692 of the Line Item Veto Act covering expedited appeal will be noted when appropriate.
20. See Petrilla, supra note 1, at 469.
21. See Devins, supra note 2, at 1609; see also CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN
BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE
NATION 25 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., Republican National Committee 1994)
[hereinafter CONTRACT WITH AMERICA].
22. Damian C. Shammas, Casenotes; Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 – Presentment Clause – A
Federal Statute that Authorizes the President of the United States to Render Duly Enacted Items
of New Direct Spending and Limited Tax Benefits Without Legal Force or Effect Violates the
Presentment Clause – Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998), SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 687, 688-89 (Spring 1999). See also Michael Gerhardt, The Bottom Line on the Line Item
Veto Act of 1996, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233, 235 (citing 135 CONG. REC. S614 (daily ed.
Jan. 25, 1989) (statement of Sen. Dixon); 142 CONG. REC. S2929, S2962 (1996) (statement of
Sen. Lott); 142 CONG. REC. S2960 (1996) (statement of Sen. Gramm)).
23. Devins, supra note 2, at 1605.
24. Id.
25. Rush v. Ray, 362 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 1985) (ruling on a challenge to Iowa’s line item
veto statute).
26. Id. at 480.
27. Id. at 480-81.
28. Id. at 482.
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the court limited the Governor’s line item veto authority so that its execution
did not interfere with the intent of the entire bill.29
While Rush shed light on the subject in general, the Act that was passed at
the federal level differed from state versions significantly.30 This legislative
appeal for fiscal responsibility at the federal level did not come about
overnight, but the mid-1990s brought about a watershed event. No concerted
effort had ever taken place like that which occurred in 1994.31 Many
Republican candidates for the House of Representatives in 1994 campaigned
on the theme of smaller government, lower taxes, and fiscal responsibility.32
The centerpiece of this strategy was the “Contract with America.”33 The
“Contract with America” focused on ten points of action,34 and one of these ten
points was the line item veto.35 A line item veto combined with a balanced
budget agreement was essential to the goal of restoring budget surpluses.36
As a result of the 1994 election, the Republicans took over both houses of
Congress,37 and the Line Item Veto Act soon followed.38 President Clinton, a
supporter of the line item veto,39 then reaped the fruits of the legislative labor
that numerous Presidents of eras past desired: line item veto authority.40

29. Rush, 362 N.W.2d at 482-83. The power to excise can only be used when striking
severable items from the rest of a bill.
30. Most state line item veto statutes allow the governor to strike provisions before
becoming law. Under the federal Line Item Veto Act, see supra note 19, the President must first
sign/pass the bill, in its entirety, into law then “cancel” the provisions that are subject to his “line
item veto” authority. See 2 U.S.C. § 691(a).
31. See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 21, at 19.
32. Id.
33. NEWT GINGRICH, TO RENEW AMERICA 116 (1995).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. It has further been stated:
A line item veto would restore the balance between the President and Congress . . . . By
itself a line-item veto would not solve the deficit problem over night. But it would move
us toward fiscal responsibility. It would enable the President to slash the pork residing in
the federal budget. It would also allow the Congress to disagree with the President. The
Congress could restore spending cuts by the President, if it thought the President’s
package of rescissions was inappropriate.
See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 21, at 35.
37. Devins, supra note 2, at 1605.
38. See Louis Fisher, Symposium, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 931, 1001 (1999).
39. Devins, supra note 2, at 1605.
40. The power included the power to cancel “any dollar amount of discretionary budget
authority, any item of new direct spending, and certain limited tax benefits.” Id.
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B. Legislative History
The appeals made to Congress by Presidents Reagan and Bush in the late
1980s were nothing new.41 Presidents had argued for line item veto authority
for over one hundred years,42 and consideration of a line item veto in Congress
began as far back as 1938.43 These proposals did not, however, receive serious
consideration until 1984.44 At that time, the Senate proposed a statute
requiring every appropriation be divided into separate bills, thus accomplishing
the goals of line item veto legislation.45 The proposal was never voted on,
however, because of a Senate filibuster.46 However, the calls for greater
institutionalized fiscal reform did not end there. With political pressure
escalating as feverishly as deficit spending, dozens of proposed bills and
constitutional amendments addressing the line item veto or similar measures
were introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s.47 Nevertheless, no
substantial action was taken until 1996.48 Despite considerable popular
support, serious questions were raised about the authority the Act granted to
the President.49
41. The President had no formal budget responsibilities prior to 1921; however, the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921, enacted due to the large debt accumulated from World War I,
required the President to submit a formal budget proposal. Although Congress was free to alter,
add, or subtract from any of the recommendations, the Act finally gave the President a recognized
stake in the budgetary process. Id. at 1610-11. See also The Budget and Accounting Act of
1921, ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20.
42. Devins, supra note 2, at 1605.
43. Michael G. Locklar, Comment, Is the 1996 Line-Item Veto Constitutional?, 34 HOUS. L.
REV. 1161, 1163-64 (1997).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1164.
47. Id.
48. Locklar, supra note 43, at 1164-65.
49. Devins, supra note 2, at 1605. Related to this topic, but outside of the narrow “line item
veto” discussion, was a debate concerning presidential impoundment that raged for years.
Throughout our nation’s history, presidents have “impounded” appropriated funds—with or
without specific legislative authority. See Locklar, supra note 43, at 1169. From Jefferson to
Nixon, presidents have impounded appropriated funds for a variety political and/or policy
reasons. See generally id. Thomas Jefferson was the first to refuse to spend appropriated funds
because he considered the appropriation unnecessary. See Cathy S. Neuren, Note, Addressing the
Resurgence of Presidential Budgetmaking Initiative: A Proposal to Reform the Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, 63 TEX. L. REV. 693, 695 (1984). President Nixon made it a common
practice to impound billions of dollars worth of appropriated funds relating to domestic programs.
See Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2117 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Scalia touts President Nixon as the
“Mahatma Ghandi” of all impounders). These presidential prerogatives helped spark the passage
of the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, Title X, 88 Stat. 332, in an attempt
to impede any misuse of the power that may violate the balance of power principles set forth in
the Constitution. See Locklar, supra note 43, at 1171; see also Kendall v. United States ex rel.
Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 613 (1838). The Kendall Court attempted to limit the use of impoundment,
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C. Case History
Clinton v. City of New York50 was not the first constitutional challenge to
the Act. The first case was National Treasury Employees Union v. United
States.51 In that case, the Union claimed that the Act compromised its ability to
influence legislation favorable to its members.52 The Supreme Court never
decided the merits of the case, ruling that the plaintiffs had not suffered a
concrete injury and that the Union’s complaint and concern was not a case and
controversy under Article III.53
The second challenge to the Act came from members of Congress, led by
the senior Senator from West Virginia, Robert Byrd. In Byrd v. Raines,54 the
district court held that the Act violated the Presentment Clause of the
Constitution.55 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on expedited appeal.56
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that the individual members of Congress
who brought the suit had not suffered a clearly identifiable, concrete injury for
which relief could be granted, and thus lacked standing to maintain the suit.57
Since the Act’s passage, President Clinton had cancelled eighty-two items
in eleven laws passed by the Congress.58 However, Congress reinstated thirtyTwo of the
eight of those provisions over the President’s veto.59
aforementioned cancellations led to the legal challenges to the Act eventually
decided in Clinton.60

holding that when Congress allocates money for a specific purpose, the Postmaster General
could only perform the ministerial function to spend it. See id. Although impoundment has been
employed for centuries, it has not been totally vilified and has been limited by the court. See Train
v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975). Hence, other attempts to curb Congress’ huge appetite
for spending had been attempted, yet failed. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 2, at 1614-16 (noting
that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act failed to discipline Congress and even higher deficits
followed). As a result, Congress took more aggressive action in 1996 to cut the deficit and
control runaway spending. See Devins, supra note 2, at 1605.
50. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2091.
51. National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1425 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
52. Locklar, supra note 43, at 1191. See also National Treasury Employees Union, 101 F.3d
at 1426.
53. Locklar, supra note 43, at 1191.
54. Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
55. Id. at 27, 38.
56. Raines, 521 U.S. 811.
57. Id. at 829.
58. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION 36 (1997).
59. Id.
60. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2095.
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D. The Presentment Clause
The Presentment Clause is central to the majority’s decision in Clinton.
The Constitution mandates that every bill shall, before it becomes law, pass
both Houses of Congress61 and be presented to the President of the United
States.62 The Framers made it paramount and absolutely essential to the
legislative process that legislation be presented to the President.63 In INS v.
Chadha, the Supreme Court announced that presentment to the President was
so fundamental that special pains were taken to assure that the requirement
could not be circumvented.64 Furthermore, it was clear the Framers believed
the Presentment Clause would provide an executive check on congressional
power.65
III. CLINTON V. CITY OF NEW YORK
A. Summary of the Majority Opinion in Clinton v. City of New York
“Our Constitution was not written in the sands to be washed away by each
wave of new judges blown in by each successive political wind.”
- Hugo L. Black (1970)

1. Justice Stevens’ Majority Opinion
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for the Court in Clinton, holding that
the Line Item Veto Act violated the Presentment Clause by departing from the
“finely wrought” constitutional procedure for enacting law.66 The Clinton
Court first addressed the justiciablity issue, which had prevented it from
deciding a previous challenge to this statute one year earlier in Raines v.
Byrd.67 The Court ruled that the appellees68 in this case had standing to
61. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
62. Id.
63. See id. at cl. 3.
64. Locklar, supra note 43, at 1176 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947 (1983)).
65. J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe
and Kurland, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 457 (1990). See also Locklar, supra note 41, at 1176
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 492, 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
Alexander Hamilton stated that:
If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the legislative body to invade the rights
of the executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretical propriety would of themselves
teach us that the one ought not to be left to the mercy of the other, but ought to possess a
constitutional and effectual power of self defense.
66. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2107.
67. Raines, 521 U.S. at 811 (holding that the members of Congress who brought suit did not
have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act).
68. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2092. The appellees in this case were consolidated from two
separate actions. The plaintiffs in the first case included the City of New York, two hospital
associations, one hospital, and two unions representing health care employees. The second case
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challenge the Act’s constitutionality.69 The Court concluded the appellees had
suffered the requisite “immediate, concrete injury” to establish standing.70
On August 11, 1997, President Clinton cancelled an “item of new direct
spending” and a “limited tax benefit” that prompted the two constitutional
challenges examined in Clinton.71 The first cancelled item, § 4772(c) of the
Balanced Budget Act,72 relieved New York of approximately $2.6 billion in
tax liability.73 The President complied with the procedural requirements of the
Act.74 Further, Congress failed to pass a disapproval bill; consequently, the
cancelled item was not reinstated. The New York appellees then filed suit
against the President and other federal officials.75
The President also cancelled § 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,
which permitted qualified processing facilities and food refineries to defer
capital gains taxes from the sale of their facility or refinery to a farmers’ co-

involved the Snake River farmers’ co-op and one of its individual members. For the purposes of
this consolidated case, they will all be uniformly referred to as “Appellees.” Id. at 2097.
69. Id. at 2095.
70. Id. at 2099. The Court held that New York had a multibillion-dollar contingent liability
eliminated. Thus the state suffered an “immediate, concrete injury” the moment the section was
cancelled by the President. Id. The Court additionally ruled that under New York statutes, the city
and the appellee health care providers would be assessed by the state to recoup the state’s losses.
Therefore, the appellees have the same potential liability as the state. Id. Furthermore, another
cancellation inflicted “a sufficient likelihood of economic injury” on the Snake River appellees,
thus establishing standing under precedents. Id. at 2100. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401
U.S. 617 (1971) (holding that probable economic injury is sufficient to satisfy Article III
requirements).
71. Shammas, supra note 22, at 694.
72. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2095.
73. Shammas, supra note 22, at 694-95. See also Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2095. Shammas
noted:
Under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, the federal government transfers money to the
states to aid in financing medical care for the indigent. Under the Medicaid Voluntary
Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of 1991, these federal subsidies are
decreased by the amount of certain taxes that the states impose on health care providers.
In 1994, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) informed the State of New
York that some of its taxes were covered by the 1991 amendments, thereby obligating the
state to return nearly $1 billion to the federal government. The state applied for a waiver,
but HHS had not determined at the time of the passage of Section 4722(c) whether or not
to grant it. The uncertain status of the state’s waiver request prompted the state to lobby
Congress for relief.
Shammas, supra note 22, at 694-95.
74. Shammas, supra note 22, at 694-95.
75. Id. See also Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2102, 2095-97. The New York appellees included the
city of New York, two hospital associations, one hospital, and two unions that represented the
health care employees. See id. at 2097.
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op.76 Congress again failed to pass a disapproval bill, and the Snake River
appellees soon filed suit.77 Due to these events, the Clinton Court held that the
appellees in both aforementioned cases had suffered sufficient and concrete
injuries to maintain their respective suits, which were later consolidated.78
Justice Stevens then proceeded to decide the case on its merits.79
Construing the language of the Act itself, the Court found the authority
granted to the President to be overly broad.80 The Court reiterated the force of
the statute, whereby the President had the power to “cancel in whole” three
types of provisions after he or she has signed the bill into law.81 The President
could cancel “(1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any
item of new direct spending; or (3) any limited tax benefit.”82 The Court stated
the New York case (one of the two cases joined here) clearly involved an item
of new direct spending, and the Snake River (the other of the two cases joined)
case involved a limited tax benefit.83 The Court acknowledged the President
acted within his power under the Act by canceling the above stated
provisions,84 but reasoned that the President amended two Acts of Congress by
using his cancellation authority85 and that any repeal of a statute passed by
Congress must conform with Article I.86 Since no provision in the Constitution

76. Shammas, supra note 22, at 695-96. See also Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2096; H.R. REP. NO.
105-148, at 420 (1997); 141 CONG. REC. S18739 (Dec. 15, 1995). The Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997 provides in pertinent part:
For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘qualified refiner or processor’ means a domestic
corporation – (A) substantially all of the activities of which consist of the active conduct
of the trade or business of refining or processing agricultural or horticultural products, and
(B) which during the 1-year period ending on the date of the sale, purchases more than
one half of such products to be refined or processes from – (I) farmers who make up the
eligible farmers’ cooperative which is purchasing stock in the cooperation in a transaction
to which this subsection is to apply.
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, 26 U.S.C. § 968(g).
77. Shammas, supra note 22, at 696. See also Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2102, 2097. Further, if
§ 968 had become law, the farmers’ co-op and an individual, potential seller, Mike Cranney, a
member, Director, and Vice Chairman of the co-op, would have been able to defer payment of
capital gains taxes. Id.
78. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2099.
79. Id. at 2102.
80. The Court found the language overly broad because it allowed the President to strike or
cancel entire provisions at a time. Id.
81. Id. at 2103.
82. Id. at 2102. See also 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (Supp. III 1997).
83. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2096-97.
84. Id. at 2102.
85. Id. at 2102. The two bills referenced are the Balanced Budget Act and the Taxpayer
Relief Act. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954).
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allows the President to amend or to repeal statutes, the Court held the Act was
unconstitutional.87
The Court viewed the Act as distorting the legislative process set forth by
the Founding Fathers.88 The Court insisted that the President, based on the
recognized powers granted to him in the Constitution, is authorized either to
veto the entire bill and send it back to Congress with his objections89 or sign
the measure into law in its entirety.90 The Court stated that cancellation power
provided in the Act was not akin to the veto and return process described in
Article I, § 7.91 Hence, based on its historical and textual analysis, the Court
concluded that the power to enact statutes must be taken very seriously and
“exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered
procedure.”92
The majority then faced the issue at the heart of the Government’s
argument. The Government (appellant) contended that the presidential
cancellations at issue in this case were not tantamount to an amendment or
repeal of an already enacted statute, but rather were exercises of discretionary
authority already granted to the President.93 The Court disagreed and took
issue with the Government’s heavy reliance on Field v. Clark.94 The Clinton
87. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2103.
88. Id.
89. The Presentment Clause provides, in relevant part:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve
he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it
shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed
to reconsider it. It after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass
the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a
Law. But in all such Cases the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and
Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the
Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall be returned by the President within
ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a
Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment
prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
90. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2103.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2104 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951). See also 33 WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 96 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940).
93. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2105; Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) (noting that the
President under his discretionary authority was allowed to suspend spending on particular items
in the Tariff Act of 1890).
94. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2106; Field, 143 U.S. at 649 (holding that the Act Cong. Oct. 1.
1890, § 3, authorizing the President to suspend, “for such time as he shall deem just,” the
provisions of that act allowing the free importations of sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, as
to any countries which impose upon the products of the U.S. duties which he “may deem to be
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Court pointed to critical differences between this Act’s cancellation authority
and the power to suspend tariff exemptions that was upheld in Field.95 The
majority acknowledged that the President has traditionally enjoyed some
statutory discretion and authority to decline to spend allocated funds.96 Unlike
previous statutes, according to the majority, the Act allowed the President
unilaterally to change the text and substance of an already enacted statute.97
The Court thus concluded there can be no such cancellation or repeal without
first amending the Constitution.98
Many have argued that the Act fundamentally changed the balance of
power between the executive and legislative branches by snatching the “purse
strings” away from Congress and handing them to the President.99 Kennedy’s
concurrence argued as much, and although the Court concluded that the
President’s actions were inconsistent with the Constitution,100 it never formally
decided the issues related to the balance of power, as the district court did. The
Court stated, “[t]hus, because we conclude that the Act’s cancellation
provisions violate Article I, § 7, of the Constitution, we find it unnecessary to
consider the District Court’s alternative holding that the Act ‘impermissibly
disrupts the balance of powers among the three branches of government.’”101
The Court clearly indicated that it did not judge either the wisdom of the
procedures authorized by the Act or the policy strengths or weaknesses of a
line item veto in the abstract.102 Instead, the Court addressed the specific
procedures and consequences of the Act from a formalistic perspective, and in
a manner whereby the framework set forth by the Act must conform with the
“finely wrought” procedure insisted upon by the Constitution.103

reciprocally unequal and unjust,” cannot be considered a delegation of legislative power,
especially in view of the fact that, from the foundation of the government, Congress has
frequently given the President similar discretion).
95. Id. at 2106. See also Field, 143 U.S. at 649.
96. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2106. The Court recognized some discretion with the execution
and implementation of allocated funds and/or tax measures, especially with respect to foreign
trade.
97. Id. at 2106-07.
98. Id. at 2107.
99. Sen. Robert C. Byrd, The Control of the Purse and the Line Item Veto Act, 35 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 297 (1998) (expounding the failures and faults of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996). It
should be noted that Sen. Byrd opposed the legislation in the Senate, and later brought suit
against the Act in 1997. Id.
100. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2107.
101. Id. at 2108. (quoting City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 179 (1998)).
102. Id. at 2107.
103. Id. at 2108. The majority also declared that if there is to be a different dynamic created
between the Executive and the Legislature regarding the determination of the final text of a law, it
must be done by constitutional amendment. Id.
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2. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence
The Separation of Powers argument that the majority overtly bypassed was
firmly espoused by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion.104 Justice
Kennedy stated the Constitution was, in part, designed to prevent
concentrations of power.105 One branch of government should not be able to
control unilaterally entire aspects of the governing process.106 Furthermore,
Kennedy quoted the Federalist Papers stating “[w]hen the legislative and
executive powers are in the same person or body, there can be no liberty.”107
Hence, Kennedy’s contention was that the Act gave the Executive power
expressly reserved for the Legislature.108
Almost defiantly, Kennedy further appealed to the Court’s duty to uphold
constitutional standards in the face of contemporary political pressures. He
warned that if the Court waned from that responsibility, the liberty of the
citizenry that the Separation of Powers was intended to protect would be dealt
a harmful blow109 if Congress, under political pressure,110 were to surrender
part of the legislative power of future Congresses.111
B. Summary of the Dissenting Opinions
“We look to the history of the time of framing and to intervening history of
interpretation. But the ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text
mean in our time.”
-William J. Brennan, Jr. (1985)

1.

Justice Scalia’s Dissent

Justice Scalia wrote a comprehensive rebuttal to the majority’s holding that
the parties in this action met all the standing requirements.112 Scalia first
claimed that the Court hastily disregarded the expedited appeal provision in the
Act in order to rule on the merits.113 He claimed that with the exception of

104. Id.
105. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2109.
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)).
108. Id. Kennedy declared that the undeniable effect of the Act was to give the President
enhanced power beyond what the Framers would have endorsed. The fact that Congress
voluntarily granted the President the powers in question was of no consequence. Id.
109. Id.
110. The line item veto. See Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2109; see also Freytag v. Commissioner,
501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 942 n.13.
111. Id. at 2109.
112. Id. at 2110-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Line Item Veto Act of 1996, 2 U.S.C. § 692 (1996).
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Mike Cranney (an appellee), a natural person, none of the other appellees fell
within the statute as “individuals.”114 Scalia believed the Court ignored the
plain language of the statute and without just cause afforded the appellees
standing under the statute’s expedited appeal provision.115
Scalia pointed out that for the Court to have Article III jurisdiction of the
instant case, a plaintiff must allege a personal injury traceable to a defendant’s
unlawful conduct that is capable of being remedied by adjudication.116
According to Scalia, the majority misinterpreted precedent.117 Scalia argued

114. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2110 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 2111. Scalia further stated that, “[t]he only individual who has sued, thus the only
appellee who qualifies for expedited review under § 692, is Mike Cranney. Since § 692 does not
confer jurisdiction over the claims of the other appellees, we must dismiss them, unless we have
jurisdiction under another statute.” Id.
The Line Item Veto Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Expedited review
(1) Any Member of Congress or any individual adversely affected by part C of Title X
of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 [2 U.S.C.A. §§ 691
to 691f] may bring an action, in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground that any provision
of this part [2 U.S.C.A. §§ 691 to 691f] violates the Constitution.
(2) A copy of any complaint in an action brought under paragraph (1) shall be promptly
delivered to the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives,
and each House of Congress shall have the right to intervene in such action.
(3) Nothing in this section or in any other law shall infringe upon the right of the house
of Representatives to intervene in an action brought under paragraph (1) without the
necessity of adopting a resolution to authorize such intervention.
(b) Appeal to Supreme Court
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any order of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia which is issued pursuant to an action brought under
paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this section shall be reviewable by appeal directly to the
Supreme Court of the United States. Any such appeal shall be taken by a notice of appeal
filed within 10 calendar days after such an order is entered; and the jurisdictional
statement shall be filed within 30 calendar days after such order is entered. No stay of an
order issued pursuant to an action brought under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this
section shall be issued by a single Justice of the Supreme Court.
(c) Expedited consideration
It shall be the duty of the District Court for the District of Columbia and the Supreme
Court of the United States to advance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest extent
the disposition of any matter brought under subsection (a) of this section.
2 U.S.C. § 692 (Supp. III 1997).
116. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2111 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Raines, 521 U.S. at 818-19.
117. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2112 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia claimed that an authority the
majority relies upon in deciding if the requisite injury was suffered, N.E. Fla. Ch., Associated
Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993), did not hold, as the majority
claims, that harm to one’s bargaining position is an “injury in fact.” Id.
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that only one of the appellees had standing118 but firmly believed the
cancellations in question did not violate the Presentment Clause.119
Scalia explained that Article I, § 7 prevents the Executive from unilaterally
canceling a law that Congress has not authorized him to cancel.120 He claimed,
however, that the Act did not violate Article I; rather, it was based on a longstanding tradition of allowing the President to cancel a law that Congress
authorized him to cancel.121 Scalia stated that the true issue in this case was
not the Presentment Clause, as the majority claimed, but the Separation of
Powers issue noted in Field.122 Scalia criticized the majority for what he
thought its opinion really represented – a fear that the Act had disrupted the
balance of power between the respective branches of government and as a
result, gave to the President a piece of law-making power traditionally held by
the legislative branch.123
Scalia’s major contention was that this “cancellation” process was not new.
He cited numerous examples, dating back to the first Congress, in which the
President was granted authority and discretion to withhold appropriated
funds.124 Scalia stated, “[t]here is not a dime’s worth of difference between
Congress’s authorizing the President to cancel a spending item, and Congress’s
authorizing money to be spent on a particular item at the President’s discretion.
And the latter has been done since the Founding of the Nation.”125
Scalia concluded with a poignant assertion that if the Act had authorized
the President to “decline to spend” items of appropriation, there is no doubt
such a measure would have been ruled constitutional. But since the word
“cancel” is used, the majority became afraid of a constitutional erratum.126 In
other words, Scalia believed that the title of the Act, compounded with the
118. The New York appellees.
119. Thus, the Snake River appellees had no standing to bring the suit, and the Court did not
have jurisdiction to resolve Snake River’s challenge to the President’s constitutional authority to
cancel the “limited tax benefit.” Id. at 2115. Although Scalia agreed that the New York appellees
had standing to challenge the President’s action because they did realize an immediate, concrete
injury, he did not believe that the cancellation of § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act amounted
to a violation of the Presentment Clause. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2115. Justice Scalia points out that in Field, Congress passed a law authorizing the
President to cancel certain trade restrictions. The Court upheld the constitutionality of that Act,
and recognized previous precedent in allowing such power. See also Field, 143 U.S. at 690.
122. Id. at 2116. See also Field, 143 U.S. at 692.
123. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2116 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 2116-17.
125. Id. at 2116. Scalia further noted that Presidents have even claimed Executive authority
to withhold appropriated funds without the consent of Congress. Although these attempts seem
to have been thwarted in most cases by the Court’s decision in Train, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) the
Court still confirmed Congress’ ability to confer discretion to the Executive to withhold
appropriated funds for a specific purpose. Id. at 2117.
126. Id. at 2118.
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campaign pledges surrounding its introduction, had “succeeded in faking out
the Supreme Court” into believing the Act violated the Presentment Clause.127
2.

Justice Breyer’s Dissent

Breyer did not challenge the Court’s standing determination, but disagreed
with the majority’s conclusion that the Act violated the Presentment Clause
and took on the Separation of Powers issue in his dissenting opinion.128
Breyer contended that the Line Item Veto Act represented a congressional
attempt to give effect to some, but not all, expenditures and revenuediminishing provisions of an enormous appropriations bill.129 He further
asserted this effort fully comported with the Constitution.130 Breyer argued
that because the modern budgetary process is so mammoth and complex,
Congress can no longer subdivide each and every appropriation into separate
bills.131 The real issue, Breyer felt, was whether Congress could choose to
create a contemporary solution (a line item veto) for a problem that did not
exist in 1776.132 Breyer maintained that the Court’s previous holdings
permitted interdependence and flexible relations between two branches of
government in order to secure a “workable government.”133 Breyer quoted
Justice Marshall in support of the functional notion that as the times and
circumstances change, so may the measures a government adopts to remedy
such circumstances.134

127. Id. Scalia further added that because he did not feel the Snake River appellees have
standing in this case it is unnecessary to rule on the constitutional validity of the President’s
cancellation of § 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act.
It should also be noted, that the process by which the Act authorized a “cancellation”
was nothing more than a codification of a longstanding practice endorsed by the Court and our
government since the founding of this nation. Id.
128. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2118 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2119. Noting that logistically, the manner in which appropriation bills were passed
two-hundred years ago, is no longer feasible.
132. Breyer stated that when our nation was founded the population was less than 4 million
and now our population is upwards of 250 million. Id. See also U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970,
pt. 1, p. 8, pt. 2, p.1104 (1975); U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, 1990 CENSUS
(noting that at our nation’s founding the first budget outlays totaled approximately $4 million,
whereas now the annual federal budget totals $1.5 trillion); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1998.
133. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2119 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 597, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
134. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2119 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer quoted Justice John Marshall:
To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all future time, execute its
powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it
the properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by
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The dissenters135 did not feel the Act was in conflict with the literal text of
the Constitution.136 They argued a simple syllogism proved the fallacy of such
a claim.137 Furthermore, the dissent stated that, “[l]iterally speaking, the
President has not ‘repealed’ or ‘amended’ anything. He has simply executed a
power conferred upon him by Congress, which power is constrained in laws
that were enacted in compliance with the exclusive method set forth in the
Constitution.”138 Hence, the President followed the letter of the law139 and
exercised the authority it expressly permitted: he did not repeal the law, but
rather executed it as the Executive.140
Breyer also engaged in a discussion concerning Separation of Powers
principles.141 In doing so, Breyer presented three questions: (1) Has Congress
given the President the wrong kind of power? (2) Has Congress given the
President the power to “encroach” upon Congress’ own constitutionally
reserved territory? (3) Has Congress given the President too much power,
violating the doctrine of nondelegation? Breyer answered all three in the
negative.142
Justice Breyer viewed Congress’ delegation of power as altogether
proper,143 because he viewed the execution of that power as a normal executive
function often delegated from Congress to the President.144 Breyer asserted
immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and
which can be best provided for as they occur.
See id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415 (1819)).
135. All three dissenters, Breyer, O’Connor, and Scalia joined in this section.
136. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2120 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
137. The majority’s syllogism is characterized as follows: Major Premise: The Constitution
sets forth an exclusive method for enacting, repealing, or amending laws. Minor Premise: the Act
authorizes the President to repeal or amend laws in a different way, namely by announcing a
cancellation of a portion of a previously enacted law. Id.
138. Id. at 2121. See also Field, 143 U.S. at 693.
139. The Line Item Veto Act of 1996, 2 U.S.C. § 691.
140. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2120 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer’s dissent further
pointed out that this was not the first time Congress had delegated to the President the power to
deny force or effect of statutory language. Id. at 2121-22 (citing, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 405b(e) which
provides that “if the President determine[s]” that the regulations “would have a significant
adverse effect on the accomplishment of the mission” of government agencies, “the requirement
[to promulgate] the regulations . . . shall be null and void”).
141. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2123 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. Breyer noted that “[c]onceptually speaking, it closely resembles the kind of
delegated authority – to spend or not to spend appropriations, to change or not to change tariff
rates – that Congress has frequently granted the President, any differences being in degree, not
kind.” Breyer reinforced the previous point by comparing this power to that of the presidential
discretion to spend or not to spend appropriations or to change or not to change tariff duties. See
also Field, 143 U.S. at 649. In sum, the delegations are only differences in degree and not in
kind. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2123 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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that when the Court strikes down similar constitutional issues, the reasons are
often attributed to the aggrandizement of power in one branch at the expense of
another.145 However, here, Congress retained the power to reinsert any section
the President disallowed, or to insert the cancelled provision in any subsequent
appropriations bill by a simple majority.146 Thus, under the Act, the
President’s role was not aggrandized at the expense of Congress.147
Perhaps the Justice’s most significant contribution to this constitutional
controversy was his discussion of the “nondelegation” doctrine. The
“nondelegation” doctrine prevents Congress from delegating solely
congressional authority to the executive.148 Breyer argued that no part of
Congress’ legislative power may be delegated except under the limitation of a
prescribed standard, i.e., an intelligible principle.149 The Act sought to satisfy
this standard in three ways: (i) Procedurally, the Act forced the President to
consider legislative history, construction, and intent before any cancellation
was made;150 (ii) Purposively, the Act intended to “eliminate wasteful spending
and . . . special tax breaks;”151 and (iii) Substantively, the President must be
sure that prevention of a particular item must not have an adverse effect on the
government’s essential operation or national interest.152 These standards are
broad,153 but the Court has routinely held congressional delegation of authority
to the executive branch appropriate,154 if “reasonable” and in the “public
interest.”155
Breyer admitted that this was a close constitutional issue. However, the
means employed by the Act did not constitute enactment, repeal, or an
amendment to an already duly enacted law. Moreover, the means employed
did not violate the Separation of Powers or inappropriately shift lawmaking
145. Id. at 2124. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714 (1986) (declaring congressional usurpation of execution power improper and
unconstitutional).
146. See Line Item Veto Act of 1996, 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692.
147. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2124 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 2125.
149. Id. See also United States v. Chicago, M., St. P & P.R. Co., 282 U.S. 311, 324 (1931).
150. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2125 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
151. Id. See also H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-491, at 15 (1996).
152. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2125 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also 2 U.S.C. § 691(a)(A) (Supp.
III 1997).
153. Id.
154. See also National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding the
delegation authority given to the FCC as in the national interest and necessary); United States v.
Rock Royal Co-Operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 537 (1939) (holding that if milk prices were
deemed unreasonable, the Secretary could adjust said prices in lieu of a public interest).
155. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2125-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Furthermore, judicial review of
matters involving delegation to the President seems less important than reviewing powers granted
to an agency because the President is held accountable to the electorate for the decisions made.
Id. at 2128.
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power from Congress to the President.156 Breyer agreed with Scalia that the
title of the Act did not truly depict the powers it granted.157 Thus, the Act
merely represented an experiment that may or may not have made our
government work better, but according to the dissenting justices’ the
Constitution clearly authorized “Congress and the President to try novel
methods in this way.”158
IV. ANALYSIS
On April 9, 1996, President Clinton signed the Line Item Veto Act.159 The
Act enabled the President to sign into law a comprehensive bill, then granted
him the authority to prevent items160 from having “legal force or effect,”161
provided the cancellation “reduce[d] the Federal budget deficit,” did “not
impair any essential government functions” and did “not harm the national
interest.”162
For the purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed that the Court had
jurisdiction and that all of the standing requirements were met.163 It should be
noted, however, that although Clinton will be remembered as the “line item
veto case,” its impact on the law of standing may be equally significant.164
156. Id. at 2131.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130 (1997).
160. 2 U.S.C. § 691 (chosen spending provisions and limited tax benefits).
161. 2 U.S.C. § 691(e)(4).
162. James I. Alexander, Note and Comment: No Place to Stand: The Supreme Court’s
Refusal to Address the Merits of Congressional Members’ Line Item Veto Challenge in Raines v.
Byrd, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 653, 653-55 (1998).
163. See William Funk, Standing in the Supreme Court and Circuits: October Term 1997, 51
ADMIN. L. REV. 343, 354 (1999). See also Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2110-31 (Scalia and O’Connor,
however, dispute the standing credentials for the Snake River appellees). Id.
164. Shammas, supra note 22, at 732. Shammas stated:
The Court has spawned an aberration to standing jurisprudence that will require
substantial limiting or further development and refining in future cases. By finding that
the Snake River appellees had standing to challenge the Act, the Court ignored standing
precedents, especially the strikingly similar fact scenarios of Allen and Simon. In both
cases, the Court refused to find standing based on a challenge to “the Government’s tax
treatment of a third party.” While this similarity is sufficient, by itself, to deny standing,
the majority instead relied upon equal protection cases and adopted a new standard, “harm
to one’s bargaining position.” Moreover, the facts alleged by the Snake River appellees
failed to demonstrate that they had personally suffered harm to their “bargaining position,
or alternatively, that they had sustained even “a sufficient likelihood of economic injury.”
Despite the majority’s conclusion that a finding of standing for the Snake River appellees
was in accord with standing precedent and requirements, the unintended result of the
Clinton Court’s handling of the standing issue may be to allow future litigants with
questionable credentials to gain standing.
Id. (citations omitted).
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A. The Presentment Clause and a Problem with Semantics
The central problem that the majority identified with the Act was that its
procedures clashed with the “finely wrought procedures” of the Presentment
Clause.165 The Court was quick to point out that it was not ruling on the
concept of a line item veto, per se, but rather its technical execution.166
In that context, a careful analysis of the procedures maligned by the
majority exposes weaknesses in its holding. Principally, there is very little
difference between the procedures prescribed by the Act and traditional
congressional authorization of dollars to be spent on a particular item at the
President’s discretion.167 Indeed, the majority would have likely viewed the
law differently if it were instead named the “Decline to Spend Act of 1996.”
Congress has been letting presidents “decline to spend” for two hundred
years and the Court has endorsed these and other bold delegations of power.168
For example, the Tariff Act of 1890 gave the President complete authority to
suspend certain provisions of the Tariff Act if it was determined that other
countries were imposing unreasonable duties upon the United States.169 The
Court also upheld this grant of discretion to the Executive in Field.170
Moreover, executive agencies such as the Federal Communications
Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency are delegated authority
to spend billions of regulation dollars each year without congressional
approval or the President’s signature.171
In Clinton, the Court failed to recognize that although Congress cannot
delegate the power to make a law, it can make a law to delegate a power.172 If

165. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2104.
166. Line-Item Veto: Courting a Better Way: Power, supra note 18, at A20. Sen. Dan Coats
(R-IN) also remarked that the Court “decided on the basis of the procedure used, not on the basis
of the principle involved.” Id.
167. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. 2116 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia also stated: “There is not a dimes
worth of difference between Congress’s authorizing the President to cancel a spending item, and
Congress’s authorizing money to be spent on a particular item at the Presidents discretion. And
the latter has been done since the Founding of the Nation.” Id. at 2116 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. Bruce Fein, Profligacy Yes, Parsimony No, WASH. TIMES, June 29, 1998, at A14. See
also A Big Day for Bacon, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, July 2, 1998, at A14. See, e.g., Mistretta v.
United States, 448 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989).
169. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2115 (Scalia, J. dissenting); see also Act of Oct. 1, 1890, § 3, 26
Stat. 612.
170. Field, 143 U.S. at 649) (upholding the constitutionality of the Tariff Act of 1890); see
also Pub. L. 95-384, § 13(a), 92 Stat. 737 (Section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961)
Section 620(x) permitted the President to cancel certain provisions it he determined that the
regulations would have an adverse effect on the accomplishment of the mission. Furthermore, the
Court in Field gave an anthology of examples whereby the President had been conferred power
by the Legislative branch to exercise such discretion.).
171. Fein, supra note 168, at A14.
172. The Wrong Call on Line-Item Veto, TAMPA TRIB., June 27, 1998, at 10.
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it lacked such authoritative discretion, it could not give regulatory agencies the
power to write rules.173 Thus, it seems that the majority has placed its
consternation and disapproval with this bill in the wrong categorical scheme.174
Historically, the Court has often legitimized the deferral of authority from
Congress to the President,175 and still other times Presidents have unilaterally
sought more discretion176 than they were granted,177 but as the dissent pointed
out, the effect of this Act was no different than what has been accepted by
Congress, the President, and the Court for over one hundred years.178 What is
different about this case is that the Supreme Court misread the statute as
conferring new and sweeping powers to the President.179 In reality, however,
the Supreme Court was duped by a campaign pledge and its worst fears. Had
the Act authorized the President to “decline to spend,” as previous statutes
have, the Court likely would have upheld the Act.180 It was this double
standard employed by the Court, which made its holding so puzzling. In
Clinton, the Court was so concerned with the apparent textual ramifications of
the Act and the legislation’s title that it failed to give proper context to a

173. Id.
174. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2116 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Field, 143 U.S. at 649.
176. Petrilla, supra note 1. (noting that Nixon impounded upwards of $18 billion in
congressional appropriations and also used impoundments to kill entire programs). See also
William F. Mullen, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND POLITICS 67-69 (1976); Locklar, supra note 43,
at 1170-71 (noting that presidents “from Grant to Johnson to Nixon” have sought presidential
impoundments).
177. Some scholars argue that the second section of the Presentment Clause may already give
the President line item veto power. The Presentment Clause provides:
—Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of
—Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be
presented to the
—President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved
by him, or being
—disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House of
Representatives,
— according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
See Sidak & Smith, supra note 65. The authors note that the reason the Presentment Clause, as
instituted, was not to protect Congress, but rather to ensure the Executive played a vital role in the
process. See also Stephen Glazier, Reagan Already Has Line-Item Veto, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4,
1987, at A14 (noting that President Bush contemplated a test case to determine if, in fact, he did
already possess line item veto authority); Interview by Owen Ullmann and Ellen Warren of
President George Bush, at the Office of the Press Secretary at the White House (July 25, 1989).
178. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2116 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Act of Oct. 1, 1890, § 3, 26
Stat. 612.
179. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2109 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 2118 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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congressional attempt to police itself from decades of deficit spending,181 and
conceivably restore the balance of power the Founding Fathers envisioned.182
The Court refused to deny Congress the power to write into any law that a
particular provision would be effective only with the [P]resident’s approval.183
Ironically, that is exactly what Congress did with the Act.184 In effect,
Congress passed a law that put an asterisk next to every appropriation that
referred to the earlier law providing for a presidential “OK.”185 In addition,
Congress retained the power to insert language in any appropriation exempting
it from the line item veto statute, so no law-making power was lost to the
executive branch.186
Thus, semantics and a fear of a campaign pledge effectively scared the
Court away from allowing a novel experiment.187 The Court may have
believed the Act’s title implied an unconstitutional means to an end; but the
Act expressly comported with the Constitution in an attempt to reform many of
the indulgences of modern-day “logrolling.”188 The Framers intended the
presidential veto to serve two functions: to protect the President from the
encroachment of the Legislative branch, and to protect the country from
harmful laws deemed appropriate by the majority.189 The line item veto is
consistent with both of these goals. First, it does not usurp any legislative
function that the Court has not allowed before. Second, it would aid the
attempt to institutionalize fiscal reform of a legislative process often dominated
by “logrolling,” “back scratching,” and “pet projects.”190
The line item veto is a vital piece of the long-term budget deficit-solving
puzzle. If even symbolic, the line item veto represents the political will to cut
deficit spending, and permanently restore fiscal responsibility to the nation’s
affairs.191

181. See Devins, supra note 2, at 1607 (stating that Congress may have wanted to take the
political onus off of them and allow someone outside the internal legislative process be a check
on their appropriation decisions. Thus, individual congressmen can benefit, politically, from
balanced budgets without making the tough decisions).
182. Id.
183. See The Wrong Call on Line-Item Veto, supra note 172, at 10.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See generally CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 21.
188. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2131 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
189. Sidak & Smith, supra note 65, at 446.
190. Id.
191. Id. This argument withstands contemporary criticism, if only for the fact that
government spending is at an all time high. Currently, it could be argued that budget surpluses
are, in part, the result of favorable economic conditions and not that of a deep-rooted resolve to
permanently control deficit spending. Thus, it could be argued that the only long-term solution to
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B. Separation of Powers
The passage of the Act was a gallant attempt to employ measures of
political and fiscal accountability that Congress had disregarded in the past.192
In creating such a mechanism, many argue that the Act actually restored the
proper balance of power to its rightful disposition.193 Those who claim the line
item veto inappropriately shifted power toward the President should remember
that the 1974 Budget Impoundment Act, which is often cited as a cause of
recent deficit spending, was a tremendous shift of power away from the
Executive.194
Further, the line item veto properly addressed a contemporary problem
associated with modern-day democracy in America without frustrating or
compromising hallowed Separation of Powers goals. George Washington
wrote that a President must “approve all parts of a bill, or reject it in toto.”195
However, things are much more complex now than they were in Washington’s
day. In 1789, the nation had only four million citizens and the first general
appropriations bill was only sixteen lines long.196 Now, however, four million
people work for the federal government and a spending bill can have dozens of
titles, hundreds of sections, and thousands of expenditures.197 The effect of
such omnibus legislation has been to weaken the Executive’s veto power under
the Constitution.198 With legislative “horse-trading” as the usual cause for
many unrelated items being included in appropriation bills, requiring a
majority to reinstate cancelled items would only confirm the required majority
support needed for an item in the first place.199
The appropriations process has evolved into a gargantuan endeavor
involving “bundling” and “logrolling.” Congress should be allowed to pass

combat the effects of economic conditions on government revenues is to employ institutional
reforms such as the line item veto.
192. See Devins, supra note 2, at 1615 (explaining that Gramm-Rudman, a Congressional
attempt to curb deficit spending, displayed Congress’ inability to cut the deficit, raised questions
of where such political accountability lies, and may have encouraged budget gimmickry and
dishonest accounting schemes to hide obvious shortfalls in the budgetary process).
193. See generally Line-Item Veto: Courting a Better Way, supra note 18, at A20.
194. This shift deprived the President the historical authority to impound funds in the wake of
Watergate and presidential mistrust. Id.
195. See The Wrong Call on Line-Item Veto, supra note 172, at 10. See also Clinton, 118 S.
Ct. at 2118 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Shammas, supra note 22, at 689. See also Gerhardt, supra note 22, at 235 (citing S. REP.
NO. 104-9, at 3)
199. Shammas, supra note 22, at 689. See also HEDRICK SMITH, THE POWER GAME 470
(1989) (describing “horsetrading” as “barter politics: buying votes by doling out favors”);
Gerhardt, supra note 22, at 236 (citing 135 CONG. REC. S15, S340 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1989)
(statement of Sen. Coates)).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

190

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:167

legislation to adapt to changes in the legislative process.200 Whether the
Framers foresaw bundling is unknown.201 One thing that is known is that the
Framers saw the veto as a presidential check against abuses of legislative
power.202 Since the Framers were clear that the first function of a veto was to
protect the President from legislative encroachments,203 it may also be
plausible to accept the line item veto for that proposition alone. Moreover,
scholars have argued that the same constitutional silence that allows for
“bundling” may also sanction a presidential veto on something other than an
all-or-nothing basis.204
The formalism of the majority was well intended yet still astigmatic. In
this instance, the Court’s elevation of form over substance was a mistake.
Tolerance for government flexibility and innovation is a hallmark of
democracy.205 The Act was not inconsistent with the goals of the Separation of
Powers doctrine.206 The President was acting in an executive role and still had
no formal function in the legislative process.207 Some amount of executive
discretion should be allowed. In fact, historical evidence shows the Framers
may have even believed that congressional appropriations were considered
permissive and not required.208
Part of the genius of the Constitution is its pragmatic vision and “room for
necessary institutional innovation.”209 The government must be allowed to
delegate authority to those most apt to handle particular problems or policies.
In support of that proposition, a compelling argument can be made that the Act

200. Sidak & Smith, supra note 65, at 469-70.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 468-69.
203. Id. at 469.
204. Id. at 469.
205. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Richard D.
Heffner, Penguin Books Mentor ed., 1984) (1956).
206. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2118 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
207. Although some scholars argue that if the line item veto power were upheld, the power
alone may preempt certain Congressional spending items that would likely be vetoed. See
Devins, supra note 2, at 1621.
208. Some authors have even argued that while Congress has the authority to appropriate
funds for an action of government, only the executive should have the power to carry out that
task. Like with prosecutorial discretion, the executive should have a heightened role in decisions
concerning government spending. And just like prosecutors in a criminal case, it is impossible to
fund each and every program while staying within the confines of a, or the, budget. See Locklar,
supra note 43, at 1187; see also L. Gordon Crovitz, The Line Item Veto: The Best Response When
Congress Passes One Spending “Bill” a Year, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 43, 46-50 (1990) (describing why
the line item veto was not necessary before the Impoundment Control Act).
209. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2119 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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does not run afoul of the “nondelegation” doctrine.210 According to the
“nondelegation” doctrine, any congressional delegation of power must be
accompanied by an intelligible principle for the executive to use in employing
the delegated authority. First, the text of the Act reveals a principle sufficient
to guide the executive in exercising the authority. To cancel an item, the item
to be cancelled must “not impair any essential government functions,” and “not
harm the national interests.”211 The legislative history confirms the Act’s
purpose was deficit reduction.212
Considering the Court has upheld
congressional delegations driven by what some claim to be “empty standards,”
and “unranked decisional goals” before,213 it is incredible that the Act’s “clear
purpose” would have been determined not to contain an intelligible
principle.214 Thus, the Court could have upheld the Act as a constitutionally
legitimate delegation of power from the legislative branch to the executive.
Second, controlling the expenditure of federal funds arguably qualifies as
the management of government property.215 According to “nondelegation”
scholars, this is not an inappropriate delegation of power.216 Third, the
cancellation authority granted in the Act could easily be characterized as
“executive” authority.217
Despite the plausible argument that the Act could be upheld as a legitimate
delegation of congressional authority, the Court, nevertheless, found the Act
unconstitutional.218 By doing so, the formalist majority, masking themselves
as martyrs for the betrayed Presentment Clause, failed to address the more
important issue of whether the all-or-nothing dilemma facing a President, when
210. The Supreme Court 1997 Term Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 122, 130 (1998). See
Bernard W. Bell, Dead Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine, the Rules/Standards Dilemma and
the Line Item Veto, 44 VILL. L. REV. 189, 211 (1999).
211. Id. See also 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (Supp. III 1997); Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2125 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
212. The Supreme Court 1997 Term Leading Cases, supra note 210, at 130-31; see also H.R.
CONF. REP. NO. 104-491, at 15 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 892; Clinton, 118 S. Ct.
at 2125 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
213. The Supreme Court 1997 Term Leading Cases, supra note 210, at 131; Cf. Loving v.
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996) (mentioning delegations written in sweeping terms that
the Court has upheld); Mistretta, 448 U.S. at 372 (1989) (explaining Congress’ need to “delegate
power under broad general directives”).
214. The Supreme Court 1997 Term Leading Cases, supra note 210, at 131.
215. Bell, supra note 210, at 208-09. See also DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT
RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 46, 186 (1993)
[hereinafter SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY] (“Rather, Congress may allow
the executive branch to manage the public domain, including making management rules.”).
216. Id.
217. See Bell, supra note 210, at 208-09. “In enforcing the delegation doctrine, the Court can
uphold statutes leaving the president [sic] with the discretion already within executive power,
however defined.”
218. Id. See generally SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 215.
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omnibus appropriation bills are sent to his desk, is vital to maintaining our
hardy system of checks and balances.219
Moreover, under the Act, Congress delegated to the President the
authority, validated in the past,220 to refuse to spend allocated dollars or to
cancel certain tax benefits signed into law. Under a doctrine set forth by
Justice Jackson,221 “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization by Congress, his authority is at its maximum,”222 and thus such
legislation should be shielded from the harsh judicial scrutiny as found in
Clinton.
The Clinton Court shied away from directly discussing the Separation of
Powers implications of the Act.223 Consequently, we are left to work with the
language of the Act. The major implication is that if the statute had been
worded differently the Court probably would have allowed the statute to
stand.224 Thus, in subsequent legislation pertaining to the line item veto,
Congress would be wise to insert a clause stating that the President may
“decline to spend” an item of appropriation, rather than language suggesting
either cancellation of an appropriation or that the President may prevent an
item from having full “force or effect.”225
C. Prospects for the Future
While the line item veto has been temporarily defeated,226 the Supreme
Court may have left the back door open. The Court’s frustration with the Act
was not with the concept itself,227 rather its wording and its apparent violation
of the Presentment Clause and the Constitution’s “finely wrought”
procedure.228
The debate surrounding this issue will not end with the Clinton decision.
The Administration has already indicated it is looking into ways to exercise the
line item veto consistent with the Court’s ruling,229 and lawmakers have
pledged the same.230
219. Id.; see also Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2106.
220. See Field, 143 U.S. at 694 (validating the Act Oct. 1, 1890, § 3).
221. Known as “Jackson’s Maxim.”
222. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
223. See Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2108. No other Justice in the majority joins Kennedy’s
dissent, which addresses the Separation of Powers doctrine. Id.
224. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. at 2118 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2107.
227. Id. at 2104.
228. Id.
229. Supreme Court Special Issue: What Has the Court Done? Constitutional Separation of
Powers, 19 NO. 8 JUD/LEGIS. WATCH REP. 5 (1998).
230. See Jeff Barker, Veto Law Rejected by Court: McCain Vows to Retool Line-Item
Authority, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 26, 1998, at A1.
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The most obvious solution would be to pass a constitutional amendment
allowing for a presidential line item veto.231 This would avoid any further
litigation on the matter but is extremely unlikely to occur.232
Congress might also discipline itself to pass bills on single subjects, thus
accomplishing the goals of the line item veto.233 This initiative would require
Congress to pass legislation on its merits or reject it. In addition, Congress
would still have the constitutional right to override a presidential veto.234 In a
recent development, legislation was introduced into Congress to cut pork barrel
spending in this manner.235 Senator John McCain has introduced the “Separate
Enrollment and Line Item Veto Act of 1999” (“Separate Enrollment Act”).236
The Separate Enrollment Act attempts to accomplish the goals of the fallen Act
by requiring every spending item or tax benefit be presented to the President
via a mini-bill. This would enable the President to pass or veto individual
items as opposed to an all-or-nothing decision on entire bills. Congress would
have to act separately to overturn a presidential veto as well.237 For the time
being, however, the renewed calls for line item veto authority or similar
legislation may have fallen on deaf ears. The Separate Enrollment Act was
introduced nearly one year ago in early 1999, and no vote has been taken on
the measure since it was introduced.238
In an alternative to legislation, some authors have suggested that the
President might already possess an excision power.239 This power would allow
the President to excise unsightly provisions from bodies of legislation on the
supposition that it is within his duties “to faithfully execute the laws and

231. See J. Gregory Sidak, Essay, The Line Item Veto Amendment, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1498
(1995) (discussing the benefits of a Line Item Veto Amendment).
232. See Stanley E. Collender, Line-Item Veto Deserved Own Veto, NEWSDAY, June 30, 1998,
at A31.
233. Thus, Congress could pursue the goals of the line item veto by way of fiscal
responsibility and cutting deficit spending by reintroducing political accountability to lawmaking
and enactment. See also Sidak, supra note 231.
234. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
235. McCain Unveils Fiscal Priorities for 106th Congress, Gov’t Press Release, Jan. 15,
1999, available in 1999 WL 2221752.
236. Id.
237. Id. Senator McCain also seeks to end the practice of attaching riders to appropriations
bills (amending Senate rules). Rep. John Kasich (R-OH) has also introduced legislation that
provide for “Expedited Rescission” to relax the 1974 Budget Impoundment Act which deprived
the President of his historical authority to impound funds. See Line-Item Veto: Courting a Better
Way, supra note 18, at A20.
238. Although the bill was introduced January 19, 1999, the Senate has taken no action prior
to the submission of this article).
See Bill Summary (visited Jan. 31, 2000)
<http://thomas.loc.gov> (click on “Bill Summary & Status-106th” then type “S100” into
“Bill/Amendment No.”).
239. Sidak & Smith, supra note 65, at 452.
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defend the Constitution.”240 This scheme is based on the premise that the
provision in question violates the Constitution. Even assuming arguendo that
in a hypothetical situation, the President would claim that strangling debt and
unchecked spending threatened our nation’s ability to function or even our
national security,241 it is unlikely the court would allow such a measure as
within the scope of the President’s constitutional duties.242
Another proposition might entail Congress invoking the Necessary and
Proper Clause to allow the President apt discretion through a line item veto.243
Congress has the power to make any laws necessary for carrying out its
enumerated powers.244 If the members of Congress determine that the line
item veto is vital to the nation’s effort to control spending and permanently
restore fiscal responsibility to the federal government, then this rationale might
pass constitutional muster under the “nondelegation” doctrine and its
intelligible principle test.245
Simple impoundment of appropriated funds from legislation to legislation
may provide another solution, but is unlikely to produce the long-term effect or
legitimacy a line item veto would provide. Yet a bolder option may exist. A
strong Executive might choose a politically propitious time to revive the lost
art of mass impoundment246 and use the forum created to take his or her case to
240. Id.
241. Id. at 453-54. Many argue that allowing the President to have the implicit power of
excision is actually a structurally stronger argument than a line item veto, because it roughly
resembles an impoundment, and has been used by President Reagan, for example; however, it
again fails to give Congress the opportunity for a legislative override.
242. Id. This may work with matters of foreign affairs, but as general policy would probably
be unconstitutional. See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 549.
243. Locklar, supra note 43, at 1188-89.
244. The standard of review under this theory is the intelligible principle standard, as with the
nondelegation principle discussed above. Id. at 1188; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
245. See Locklar, supra note 43, at 1188. It is an attempt to control spending, and since
Congress has the power of the purse, this may be a solution worth considering. See also
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Deviant Executive Lawmaking, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 9
(1998). Prakash states that “the Necessary and Proper Clause permits delegation of cancellation
and modification discretion.” Id. at 11. It should further be noted that the line item veto might be
a “harder sell” in 2000 and beyond while annual budget surpluses and a growing economy
disguise the immediate need for such measures. So, in effect, the budget surpluses enjoyed now
and sought by initiatives like the line item veto may have sealed its fate. However, one can
suppose that was the goal all along, but time will certainly tell.
246. Again, impoundment refers to the refusal to spend appropriated funds.
See
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., POWERS OF THE PRESIDENCY 94-95, 264-65 (2d. ed. 1997);
Kristafer Ailslieger, Supreme Court Vetoes the Line Item Veto Act (Clinton v. City of New York,
118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998)), 38 WASHBURN L.J. 893, 899 (1999). Impoundment has gained
momentum throughout the twentieth century. The Anti-Deficiency Acts of 1905 and 1906
allowed the President to waive spending funds appropriated by Congress in the case of
emergencies or other unusual circumstances. See id. at 899. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1905, ch.
1484, § 4, 33 Stat. 1257; Act of Feb. 27, 1906, ch. 510 § 3, 34 Stat. 48. In 1950, Congress
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the populous247 and create a public policy showdown. The President might
then make the issue of fiscal responsibility a major theme and use the office as
a bully pulpit to force Congress’ hand in the matter. With the prospects of
legislative action remote,248 a presidential power play and a governmental
showdown may be necessary to get the issue back on the legislative table and
to the forefront of American politics.249
In reality, however, the Clinton decision has probably killed the line item
veto, and the momentum that put it on the legislative agenda. On that account,
it should be clearly stated that the fact this legislation (the Act) came about in
the first place was extraordinary.250 It may have taken a realigning election in
1994,251 and the culmination of a generation’s worth of political capital and
momentum for any Congress to give up such grand appropriation power. With
all that said, it seems unlikely that an atom’s worth of the energy that fueled
the astonishing reversal of a half century’s worth of government excess exists
today in a political environment insulated by economic prosperity some five
years later.252
To that end, some scholars have argued that the line item veto has lost its
significance because of the recent federal budget surplus the nation now
enjoys.253 To those, however, that may question the line item veto’s
amended the Anti-Deficiency Act by expanding its scope to allow rescission of any funds not
required to carry out the purpose of the underlying appropriation. See Ailslieger, supra, at 899.
See also Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 29. However, Congress curtailed the President’s ability to
impound funds with the Impoundment Control Act. See Ailslieger, supra, at 899; see also
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., supra, at 40.
247. It should be noted that the Train decision coupled with the Impoundment Control Act of
1974 did limit the use of impoundments. However, that is not the point. Impoundment could be
used to force the broader issues of balanced budgets, and the necessity of a line item veto to the
agenda in order to sustain projected budget surpluses and hogtie pork barrel spending.
248. See supra note 238.
249. Despite the claim that “the era of big government is over,” federal spending is at all time
heights. See Prepared Statement of John E. Berthoud, Ph.D. President, The National Taxpayers
Union Before the House Committee on Rules Subcommittee on Legislative & Budget Process,
FEDERAL NEWS SERV., Mar. 11, 1998.
250. White House Defends Line-Item Veto; Justices Question Whether It Upsets
Constitutional Balance of Power, DES MOINES REG., Apr. 28, 1998, at 3. See also CAPITAL
GANG, CNN TRANSCRIPTS, Apr. 10, 1993, Transcript # 67.
251. See STEPHEN J. WAYNE, THE ROAD TO THE WHITE HOUSE 1996 77-79 (1996); see also
Thomas B. Edsall, Huge Gains in the South Fueled GOP Vote in 1994, WASH. POST, June 27,
1995, at A8. Numerous authors have speculated that Republican gains made in Congress and
specifically in the South in 1994 signal a “realignment” that often occurs every thirty years or so,
or once a generation.
252. This momentum that began with the 1994 midterm elections united strange bedfellows
indeed, Democrats, Republicans, Congress, the President, supporters of enhanced executive
powers, and those calling for legislative reform. See Fisher, supra note 36, at 1001.
253. See supra note 245; see also Alison Maxwell, CBO Predicts Budget Surplus (visited Jan.
15, 2000) <http:www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0398/030498a1.htm>.
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importance, it should be noted that the same fiscally responsible initiatives and
sacrifices made in the mid 1990s by political leaders bore the line item veto
legislation this note discusses.254 The Act and its concept are part-and-parcel
of the fiscal discipline that has produced the newfound budgetary freedom. As
unlikely as current budget surpluses seemed just five years ago, it is equally
unlikely that budget surpluses will continue without institutionalized reform,
such as that embodied in the line-item veto.255
V. CONCLUSION
An examination of the Line Item Veto Act and its constitutional
consequences should have persuaded the court that its means and ends were
permissible. Nevertheless, the Court failed to allow for congressional
deference to presidential discretion as it had in the past. In sum, the Court
misinterpreted the statute and its implications, and declared unconstitutional a
legitimate attempt to permanently restore fiscal responsibility to the federal
government.
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